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Abstract 
Cybercriminals are constantly developing techniques to infect computers by embedding malicious 
code on innocent websites and luring victims to them. To prevent data loss in a mobile connected 
world, corporations are employing a variety of techniques. These include filters, anti-virus software, 
encryption and firewalls, access control, written policies and improved employee training. This paper 
conducts a concise study of web filtering vis-à-vis their installed positions, deployment layers, 
employed filter technologies and comparison between Web Filters that are in place in Canada, United 
Kingdom, and China. 
Keywords 
Web Filtering, Filter Deployment, Filter Operating Layers, Rating Filters, Blacklisting, Keyword 
Matching, Dynamic Filtering. 
Introduction 
Web filtering is a class of content filtering techniques [1] used by corporations and home users as a 
part of Internet firewall to determine whether incoming data is harmful to the network or outgoing 
data includes any intellectual property. The filter checks every Web page against a set of predefined 
rules and blocks harmful and objectionable data like pornographic material, spyware, viruses, etc. 
from entering the network or the home computer.  
Web Filtering guarantees manageable Internet access by reducing the unnecessary use of network 
resources, increasing work productivity, decreasing risks of Internet abuse, and decreasing security 
and legal risks. 
More than forty Western and non-Western countries including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, UK, and Netherlands are using Web filters to block Websites considered to be 
inappropriate. 
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Filter Deployment 
A Web Filter can be installed at various places in the Network and may operate at various levels of 
the OSI Model as depicted in figure 1. The legends1 through 5 denote the place of filter as explained 
in the below paragraphs. The customization options, Performance of the filter and Security provided 
depend greatly on the place of the deployment [2, 3]. 
1. At National/Country Level: The Filter is deployed between the national Internet 
Backbone and the country network.  Several nations including China and Saudi Arabia 
have implemented filters at National Level. Filter Configuration is wholly determined by 
the Governmental. Users have no control over filter customization, its performance and 
thus security provided by the filter is determined by the policy of the Government. 
2. At Organizational Level: The Filter is deployed between the Organizational Network and 
the Internet Gateway. All users of this Gateway Server e.g. all employees of the 
Organization are provided filtered Internet Content. The KU Gateway installed at 
http://192.168.81.251:8090/corporate/servlet/CyberoamHTTPClient is an example of 
Organizational Level Filtering. The filter is customizable by the Organizations Web 
Administrators keeping into consideration the Organizational policy regarding what is 
appropriate and what is not for the organization. Organizations besides providing filtered 
content also can limit the durations of use of the Internet.  
3. At Internet Server Provider: The Filter is installed at the ISP Gateway and provides 
filtered content to all its customers. Informal Government pressures in Canada and UK 
led major ISPs to voluntarily institute filtering to block inadequate access to child 
pornography and child abuse material. Courts in France, Belgium and Germany have 
ordered ISPs to block hate speeches and the illegal peer to peer file shearing of copyright 
protection material. As per our knowledge no ISP in India provides filtered content to its 
customers. 
4. At Individual Level: The Filter is installed at the local computer or workstation. The 
Filter may be part of a Firewall, Antivirus package, or through some other similar system 
like Content Advisor, Parental Control, etc. 
5. At Third-Party: The Filtering service is provided by a trusted third party vendor through 
its Security Operation Canters (SOCs). The customers send their Web Traffic through 
these SOCs by proxying. ScanSafe and WebSense are the examples of such Third-Party 
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Vendors. Although suitable for all kinds of organizations and users, this service is limited 
to small and medium organizations but offers filtering at any level of an organization.  
 
Figure 1: Filter Deployment 
Filter Operating Layers 
The Filter installed at various places in the network may operate at either layer 3 called Network 
Layer or layer 4 called Transport Layer or at Layer 7 called Application Layer of the OSI 
Networking Model. Filters installed at Layers 3 and 4 are referred to as Network Layer Filters and 
those installed at Layer 7 are called Application Layer Filters.  
1. Layer 3 of the OSI model is responsible for logical addressing and routing of data using 
protocols like IP. The packet contains source and destination addresses which can be used to 
block the transmission of the packet based on some defined rules of the filter.  
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2. Layer 4 of OSI model is responsible for formatting and transporting data using protocols like 
TCP and UDP. The packet at this layer contains source and destination addresses besides 
containing information about the type of network traffic thus enabling blockage of traffic 
from certain address meant for a particular application. 
3. Layer 7 of the OSI model is responsible for data analysis before sending it to a particular 
application. At this layer packets are assembled and thus inspection of the data arriving for a 
particular application can be undertaken by performing deep inspection for the content 
filtering. Application Proxy firewall operates at this layer of the OSI model. 
 
Figure 2: OSI Model 
Filtering Techniques 
Web Filtering techniques [4, 5, 6, 7] vary on the basis of their workings and the data they 
work upon. Figure 3 shows four possible filtering techniques namely rating based, 
• Enables user to accept to access the network. Provides user Interfaces and
support to services like email, WWW, FTP, remote Login, etc. Gateway
Operates at this Layer. Addressing varies on the basis of service e.g. email
addresses, URL Addresses, FTP connection addresss, etc.
Application Layer
Layer 7
• Handles the Systax and Sementics of the information exchanged between
two applications. Provides translation of Syntax between different systems,
encryption, decryption and compression.
Presentation Layer
Layer 6
• Acts as a network dialog controller. Establishes, maintains and
synchronizes the interaction between two systems.. Provides Dialog Control
and Dialog Seperation Services.
Session Layer
Layer 5
• Responsible for Process to Process Delivery. Provides QOS through
Connection Oriented and Connectionless transmission of IP datagrams in
Transport layer packets. Uses Protocols Like TCP,UDP, SPX. Does Port
Addressing, Segementation and reassembly, Connection control Flow
Control and error Control.
Transport Layer
Layer 4
• Responsible for End to End Transmission of datagrams across an
Internetwork including Fragmenting , LOgical Addressing and
Routing.Uses Protocols Like IP, IPX, NetBEUI. Router Operate at this
Layer. Messaging unit is Datagram which includes IP addresses,
identifying computers on Internetwork.
Network Layer
Layer 3
• Responsible for packet transmission betwween two systems on LAN. Does
framing, Flow Control, error Control, Access Control and Physical
Addressing. Messaging Unit is Frame and addressing through Hardware
Addresses (NIC Addresses). Protocols Like Ethernet, Token Ring, etc. are
used. Bridges and Switches Operate at this Layer.
Datalink Layer
Layer 2
• Responsible for Transmission and reception of bits of data on /from the
Medium, Signalling, Method and Cabeling, Representation of Bits, data
Rate and Synchronization.
Physical Layer
Layer 1
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decides which categories to pass and which to block. The URLs belonging to the 
categories to be blocked constitutes the blacklist. The filter compares the requested 
URL against the blacklist and allows or denies this request accordingly. It is also 
possible to blacklist on the basis of IP address and Domain name besides URL 
Blocking at IP address level permits blocking of all domains hosted on the 
corresponding Web Server. Blocking at Domain name level blocks the entire domain. 
The advantages of this method are speed and efficiency because the filter based on the 
blacklist has not to read the page before blocking or allowing.  
Its disadvantages are the difficulties faced to create, and update the URL database as it is 
labour-intensive and requires human reviewers. Human reviewers nowadays have been 
replaced by automated filtering where a spider program automatically does 
categorization.  
3. Keyword Matching: This type of filtering works by inspecting the web traffic for 
certain offensive words like ‘teen’, ‘sex’, ‘breast’ etc. and phrases, comparing them 
with its set of words and phrases to determine whether to allow or deny its access. 
Keyword matching filters is purely text-based methods. Keyword filtering is fast but 
over-blocking errors may be produced by this type of filter if the words labelled as 
offensive appear in legitimate web pages like sexton, breast cancer, etc. More precise 
content analysis methods can be used to reduce over-blocking but at the same time 
processing time will increase. Further, the efficiency of this filter for filtering 
pornography content is less because pornographic material often includes hefty data 
in pictorial and video formats. 
4. Dynamic Filtering: These filters use various statistical machine learning methods like 
Baysian, k-Nearest Neghibour, etc. to understand the semantic content of the 
information to be filtered. They use multiple features; features from text (words like 
‘sex’, ‘teen’, ‘gambling’, etc.), images (photographs in nudity), and possibly video 
clips. For filtering images for pornography colour, shapes and skin are investigated by 
algorithms like skin model, skin detection and regions of interest. Dynamic filters can 
be trained and continue to learn more with use. Several dynamic filters with 
reasonable efficiency to block pornography are available as commercial products. 
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Dynamic filters can also be used to construct and maintain blacklist categorization 
database. 
Dynamic filtering offering advantage of automated filtering and learning capabilities can be 
designed to have higher efficiency but only at the cost of speed of operation making it 
unsuitable to be used at places like ISP and Organizational gateways.  
Comparison of Filters Installed at National Level in various Countries 
Table 1 show below shows a comparison between Web Filters that are in place in Canada, United 
Kingdom, China and proposed filter of Australia. 
Australia Canada United Kingdom China 
Legislating Mandatory Filtering at ISP Level 
Yes No No 
Yes 
Around 20 pieces of 
legislation affects filtering 
Voluntary/Industry Filtering at ISP Level 
Perhaps 
Yes 
Informal Government 
Pressure 
Yes 
Informal Government 
Pressure 
Yes 
Corporate Self-censorship 
is Prevalent 
Opt-Out Provision 
No (Tier 1) 
Yes (Tier 2) No No No 
Blacklist Filtering of Blocked URLs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose of Blacklist 
Unspecified 
Blocking inadequate access 
to child pornographic 
material with HTTP 
protocol 
Blocking inadequate access 
to child pornographic 
material with HTTP 
protocol 
Blocking various types of 
illegal content 
Type of Material Blacked 
Child Pornography and 
other illegal content Child Pornography Child Pornography 
Political Content, Graphic 
Violence, Unapproved 
news, Child Pornography 
and other illegal content 
Blacklist maintained by 
ACMA 
Australian 
Communications and 
Media Authority 
Cybertip.ca Internet Watch Foundation 
Ministry of Industry and 
information; Centre 
Propaganda Department; 
Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications 
IP Address Blocking 
No No No Yes 
Deep Packet Inspection 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose of Deep packet Inspection 
NA Traffic Shaping Traffic Shaping 
Traffic Shaping, 
Dataveillance and 
Surveillance 
Other Heuristic Methods 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Australia Canada United Kingdom China 
P2P    
No 
Perhaps 
Content infringement (in 
negotiation with music 
industry) 
Perhaps Content 
infringement (in 
negotiation with music 
industry) 
Yes 
Instant Messaging 
No No No Yes 
Scope Creep 
Inevitable 
Yes 
Suicide sites, pro-terrorism 
sites, hate sites 
Yes 
Suicide sites, graphic 
terrorist beheading, pro-
terrorism sites, hate sites 
Yes 
Legislation written with 
standard vague and 
ambiguous clauses such as 
the ‘state security’ 
provision 
Offence to Circumvent Filters 
Yes 
Not an offence to use 
circumvention devices such 
as proxy for other purposes 
No No 
Yes 
Not an offence to use 
circumvention devices such 
as proxy for other purposes 
Legislative Safeguards 
No 
No Bill of Rights, 
Constitutionally implied 
freedom of political 
communication very 
limited in this content and 
of little use as a safeguard 
Limited 
Charter of human Rights 
does not bind corporations 
such as ISPs (No 
legislation compelling 
ISPs) 
Limited 
Europe Convention on 
human Rights; relevant 
case law from European 
Court of Human Rights 
No 
The human rights 
instruments are of little 
practical significance (eg. 
Freedom of Expression is 
not an individual right) 
Market Safeguard 
No 
Compulsory for ISPs 
Potentially 
Voluntary initiative subject 
to strong informal 
government pressure 
Potentially 
Voluntary initiative subject 
to strong informal 
government pressure 
None 
Technical Safeguard 
No 
Potentially 
Depends where the filtering 
routers are placed (e.g. 
router located on the 
backbone would affect all 
ISPs) 
Potentially 
Depends where the filtering 
routers are placed (e.g. 
router located on the 
backbone would affect all 
ISPs) 
Potentially 
Geographic region of 
access and bandwidth 
capability affect ability to 
access material 
Table 1: Comparison between Web Filters that are in place in Canada, United Kingdom, China and proposed 
filter of Australia [8] 
It is apparent from the above comparison that no uniform criteria for filtering have been 
adopted by the compared countries apart from child pornography, URL Blacklisting, Instant 
Messaging, and Heuristic Methods. All other parameters for filtering vary from country to 
country.  
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Effectiveness and Limitations 
Filters vary widely in their performance, and there is a trade-off between failing to block 
unauthorized content called “under-blocking” and erroneously blocking authorized content 
called “over-blocking”. Filters that block a large percentage of unauthorized content also 
block a sizable percentage of authorized content in error. Web filters can make two types of 
errors namely false positive also called over blocking and false negative also called under 
blocking. Over blocking blocks permissible websites, raising issues about freedom of speech 
and legal issues clamming damage. Under blocking allows inappropriate websites to pass 
through the filter reducing its efficiency. 
Several research works have reported that accuracy tests against filters do not provide a 
conclusive ranking about its efficiency. This is due to the fact that a filter may be highly 
accurate but it may be inefficient if only a few users are able to bypass it. Further, 
information on the Internet changes in a rapid and continuous manner forcing the filters to 
update at the same rate. A highly accurate filter may thus prove to be inefficient if it does not 
update itself with this change.  
An ideal filter that neither produces false positive not false negative errors does not exist and 
thus a balance between the two filtering errors is highly desired. It has been found that filters 
are not efficient against those who manually exchange pornographic material. But filters 
reduce the availability of prohibited content and thus serve at least its modest objective of 
protecting innocent users against abuse and exposure to sensitive material. 
Conclusion 
The study of web filtering reveals that filtering is possible at various places using a variety of 
filtering technologies which may operate at either network layer, transport layer or 
application layer of the OSI model.  Depending upon the required customization of the 
filtering criteria, position of the filtering system is determined. Positions close to the main 
backbone leave no or very less filtering customization option for the ISP or the user. No 
specific filtering technique is having cent percent accuracy.  The performance of a good filter 
may deteriorate unless it is constantly upgraded and maintained. The country level filtering 
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mechanism does not adopt any universal criteria and instead filtering criteria is decided by its 
respective governments. 
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